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ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error when it concluded that Appellant's wife 
("Mrs. Nordgren") filed a "claim" in the context of U.C.A. §30-2-11(4) when she served 
her Notice of Intent to Commence Action pursuant to §78B-3-4-412 ("Notice of Intent"); 
that Appellant's loss of consortium claim was untimely because he did not file his 
Complaint on the same day as the Notice of Intent; and that Appellant's loss of 
consortium claim is governed by U.C.A. §78B-4-401, et set. (the "Malpractice Act"). 
This position is supported by controlling Utah law, including the Utah Supreme' Court's 
decision in Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, the decision in Crabtree v. Woodman, 2008 
WL 4276957 and the plain langue of U.C.A. §30-2-11 and the Malpractice Act. 
Appellees arguments, on the other hand, hinge on the premise that Appellant's loss 
of consortium claim is governed by the Malpractice Act and that the Notice of Intent filed 
by Mrs. Nordgren constitutes a "claim" under U.C.A. §30-2-11(4). This position, 
however, is not supported by the applicable statutes or Utah case law. 
Moreover, Appellees improperly fuse the proceedings in the district court witiht 
proceedings of the private arbitration proceeding in which Mrs. Nordgren is pursuing her 
disputes against the Appellees. Appellant's loss of consortium action in District Court 
was governed by U.C.A. §30-2-11(4). Mrs. Nordgren's arbitration, on the other hand, is 
governed by the procedural requirements of the parties' Dispute Resolution Agreement 
and the Utah Arbitration Act. Therefore, the analysis of what constitutes a "claim" is 
different in this forum than in the arbitration and the two should not be confused. 
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L THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
CONCLUDED THAT MRS. NORDGREN FILED A "CLAIM" IN THE 
CONTEXT OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-11(4) WHEN SHE SERVED 
HER NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE ACTION. 
As Appellant explained in his Brief, the trial court ignored well-established 
principles of statutory interpretation of first looking to plain language used by the 
Legislature, but also reading the "plain language of the statute as a whole and interpret its 
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters.5' LPI 
Services v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, TT11, 215 P.3d 13 (citing Savage v. Utah Young VilL, 
2004 UT 102, \ 18,104 P.3d 1242). Appellees argue that the trial court's holding 
follows the plain language of Section 30-2-1 l(4)(a) and the Malpractice Act. See 
Blomquist Appellee Brief at 3. Even a cursory read of both 30-2-1 l(4)(a) and the 
Malpractice Act defeats Appellees' conclusion. 
Appellant's complaint is based on Utah's loss of consortium statute, Utah Code 
Ann. §30-2-11(4), which provides: 
A claim for the spouses' loss of consortium shall be: 
(a) Made at the time the claim of the injured person is made and joinder of the 
actions shall be compulsory; and 
(b) Subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities and provisions 
applicable to the claims of the injured person. 
Section §30-2-1 l(4)(a). The plain language of Section 30-2-1 l(4)(a) reads that a loss of 
consortium claim shall be "[m]ade at the time the claim of injured person is made". 
However, the terms "at the time" and "claim" are undefined. 
Appellees argue that because the trial court concluded that Mrs. Nordgren began 
her medical malpractice action June 12, 2007, on the day she served her Notice of Intent, 
2 
the Malpractice Act should be read in conjunction with §30-2-11(4). (R. at 123.) Again, 
the Malpractice Act does not define these terms either. The Malpractice Act does make a 
distinction between the Notice of Intent1 and a Malpractice Action2. However, this 
distinction is missed by Appellees due to their blanket acceptance of the trial court's 
determination that Mrs. Nordgren's Notice of Intent was a "claim" for the purposes of 
§30-2-11. (R. at 123-124.) 
Appellees further argue that the purposes of the Malpractice Act are frustrated 
when a loss of consortium plaintiff fails to give notice of his claims at the time the 
medical malpractice plaintiff services her notice of intent. See Blomquist Appellee Brief 
at 4. The Appellees reason that the purpose of the Malpractice Act was compromised 
when Appellant's Complaint was not filed at the time of the Notice of Intent. This 
position is not supported by Utah case law. In fact, this point ignores the Supreme 
Court's analysis in Bowling v. Sullen, 2004 UT 50, ffif 10-11, 94 P.3d 915, when it 
rejected a very similar argument made by Bullen, the health care provider, in that action: 
However, the stated purpose of the [Malpractice Act] is to alleviate health care 
costs via the establishment of a fixed window of time 'in which actions may be 
commenced against health care providers.. .Its purpose is not to confer the benefit 
of a shorter statute of limitations upon medical professional whose alleged 
transgressions are only tangentially related to their provision of health care 
services. Therefore, we cannot conclude that Bullen5 s interpretation of the Act is 
consistent with either the plain language or the legislative intent and, in keeping 
with our obligation to avoid statutory constructions that 'render some part of a 
provision nonsensical or absurd,' we reject [Bullen's] analysis. 
Dowlingat\lL 
1
 U.C.A. § 78B-3-412(l)(emphasis added). 
2
 Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-403(16) 
3 
Appellees further argue that failure to accept that the Notice of Intent is a "claim" 
would frustrate the purposes of the Malpractice Act. Id. at 4. However, this argument is 
just that, pure argument and is not supported by any Utah case law. Had Mrs. Nordgren 
not been bound by the Dispute Resolution Agreement, the filing of the Complaint would 
have been the appropriate step to "make her claim". Accordingly, Mrs. Nordgren has not 
made a "claim" under the context of §30-2-11(4) thus making it impossible for Appellant 
to derive from her Notice of Intent. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
CONCLUDED THAT UTAH CODE ANN. §30-2-11(4) REQUIRED 
APPELLANT TO FILE HIS LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM ON THE 
SAME DAY HIS WIFE SERVED HER NOTICE OF INTENT TO 
COMMMENCE LITIGATION. 
Appellees argue that the plain language of §30-2-11(4) required Appellant to make 
his loss of consortium claim on the same day that Mrs. Nordgren served her Notice of 
Intent on June 12,2007. Blomquist Appellee Brief at 6. However, in response to 
Appellant's argument that such a literal interpretation would deprive Appellant of his 
opportunity to make his claim and have an absurd result not intended by the legislature, 
Appellees now seem to concede that Appellant was not required to file his Complaint on 
June 12, 2007. Blomquist Appellee Brief at 6,fn 2. Instead, Appellees argue that 
Appellant's Complaint was untimely because he Appellees were prejudiced and forced to 
conducted discovery in Mrs. Nordgren's arbitration for fifteen (15) months before 
Appellant filed his Complaint. Appellees must begin ignoring the obvious disconnect in 
their argument. 
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Appellees assert that the legislature intended §30-2-11(4) to be interpreted broadly 
because it choose the phrase "made at the time" when referring to when a spouse of an 
injured person shall make his claim. §30-2-11 (4). Appellee Blomquist Brief at 4. 
Appellant has been unable to find any legislative history to support Appellees5 argument 
and Appellee has cited to none. Instead, Appellees criticize the reliance Appellant places 
on Crabtree v. Woodman, 2008 WL 4276957, because Judge Tena Campbell failed to 
address the "made at the time55 language in her analysis of Section 30-2-11(4). Contrary 
to the arguments made at the trial court, Appellees seem to concede their issue that a loss 
of consortium claim can be brought separately from the injured person's claim. 
Appellees position now appears to be that because of the purposes of the Malpractice 
Act, the injured person's spouse's loss of consortium claim must be included in the 
injured person's notice of intent. Again, this argument rests of the assumption that the 
Malpractice Act applies to Appellant's loss of consortium claim. It does not. 
Similarly, Appellees criticizes Appellant's reliance on Huffer v. Kozitza, 375 N.W. 
2d 480,482 (Minn. 1985), because in the Minnesota loss of consortium statute did not 
contain the "made at the time" language or the procedural requirements similar to the 
Malpractice Act. As Judge Campbell recognized when she relied upon Huffer in her 
opinion in Crabtree, even though three and a half years had passed after Ms. Huffer 
settled his injury claim, Mrs. Huffer, his former wife, was free to pursue her loss of 
consortium claims. Judge Campbell recognized the right to bring an independent 
outweighs the policy reasons to join loss of consortium claims with the injured person's 
claims. 
5 
Courts are required to "assume that each term was used advisedly; and that each 
[term] should be given an interpretation and application in accord with their usually 
accepted meaning5'. See Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Utah 
1971). Therefore, it is entirely plausible that the legislature chose the phrase "made at the 
time" to accommodate alternate forums than the courts to prosecute malpractice disputes, 
i.e. arbitration. 
Furthermore, Appellees again blur the proceedings in the instant matter and Mrs. 
Nordgren's private arbitration proceeding as it relates to when a loss of consortium claim 
must be made. Mrs. Nordgren could not subject Appellant to the terms of the Dispute 
Resolution Agreement. Therefore, Appellant had every right to file his Complaint before 
the statute of limitations expired on his claims. Moreover, the Appellees received foil 
notice of Appellant's claims when they received service of Appellant's Complaint. 
(Blomquist Appellee Brief at 6, footnote, 2.) 
HI. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
CONCLUDED THAT THE UTAH HEALTHCARE MALPRACTICE ACT 
APPLIED TO APPELLANT'S LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM. 
The trial court ruled that the procedural requirements contained in the Malpractice 
Act applied to Appellant's loss of consortium claim. Appellees' argue that the Utah 
Supreme Court has already recognized that the Malpractice Act applies to loss of 
consortium claims derived from medical malpractice injuries. See Brower v. Brown, 114 
P.2d 1337, n. 1,1338 (Utah 1987). Appellees reliance on Brower is misplaced The 
issue addressed in Brower was whether the statute of limitation on Mrs. Brower's claim 
for medical malpractice had run under the Malpractice Act. Although Mr. Brower had 
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made a loss of consortium claim, the Utah Supreme Court did not analyze Mr. Brower's 
loss of consortium claim. Id. In fact, at the time that Brower was decided, Utah had not 
recognized a cause of action for loss of consortium3. 
A. The plain language of 30-2-ll(4)(b) does not establish that Appellant's 
loss of consortium claim is governed by the Malpractice Act 
Appellees' argue that the plain language of 30-2-ll(4)(b) establishes that 
Appellant's claim is governed by the Malpractice Act because it is "subject to the same 
defenses, limitations, immunities, and provisions applicable to the claims of the injured 
person." §30-2-1 l(4)(b). Appellees argued that because Mrs. Nordgren as the "injured 
person" is subject to the Malpractice Act, then Appellant's loss of consortium claim is 
thereby subject to the defense, limitations, immunities, and provisions contained in the 
Malpractice Act. Id, Not only is Appellees' interpretation too simplistic, it also ignores 
the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Bowling v. Sullen, 2004 UT 50, 94 P.3d 915. 
In Dowling, the health care provider, Bullen, made almost the identical argument 
urged that Appellees make when it urged the Utah Supreme Court to accept the 
3
 See also Hackford v. Utah Power & Light, 740 P.2d 1281, 1290 (Utah 1987). 
Hackford was decided by the Supreme Court within months Brower. Notwithstanding 
Justice Durham dissent outlining the wisdom of adopting a loss of consortium statute, the 
Hackford Court declined to overturn previous rulings about the loss of consortium. In 
fact the Court stated that "if any cause of action argued for by the appellant is to be 
created anew in Utah, it should be done by the legislature." Id. at 1286-87. 
7 
proposition that the legislature intended for the Malpractice Act to have a broad scope4, 
"as evidenced by the word 'any' in certain key provisions." 2004 UT 50, <ft 9. Instead, 
the Supreme Court rejected Bullen's assertions and reasoned that because the legislature 
limited the types of medical services that constitute "health care5" under the Malpractice 
Act, it placed "undue weight on the comprehensive nature of the word 'any' and ignores 
the subsequent limiting language..." Id. at 10. 
Appellees, further argue that in order for the §30-2-11(4) to be interpreted in 
harmony with the purposes of the Malpractice Act, service of a Notice of Intent must 
constitute a "claim". See Blomquist Appellee Brief at 3. Appellees base this conclusion 
on the assumption that the Malpractice Act applies to Appellant's loss of consortium 
claims again because of the nature of Mrs. Nordgren's underlying medical malpractice 
4
 Had the legislature intended that all provisions of the Malpractice Act govern an 
injured person's loss of consortium claim, the legislature would have noted this intention 
in the plain language of the statute. This can be evidenced by the legislature's mandate to 
limit a loss of consortium claim pursuant to the noneconomic restrictions of the 
Malpractice Act. Section (7) reads that "damages awarded for loss of consortium, when 
combined with any award to the injured person for general damages, may not exceed any 
applicable statutory limit on noneconomic damages, including Section 78B-3-410. §30-
2-11(7). 
5
 "Health care" is defined as only those services rendered by a health care provider "for, 
to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement." 
U.C.A. §78b-3-403(10). 
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claims. Appellees yet again ignore the analysis in Dowling v. Bullen, wherein the Utah 
Supreme Court explained that the Malpractice Act did not apply to every cause of action 
involving the provision of health care services by a health care provider.. .doing so would 
lead to absurd results. 2004 UT 50, ffif 10-11. 
B. Since Appellant was not a "complaining patient", the procedural 
requirements of the Malpractice Act do not govern Appellants9 loss of 
consortium claim. 
During oral argument before the trial court, Appellant's counsel argued that 
Appellant's loss of consortium claim was not subject to the procedural provisions of the 
Malpractice Act because Appellant's claim "relatfe] to or aris[e] out o f the health care 
rendered to Mrs. Nordgren. See Dowling. (R. at 127(11-17). The trial court did not 
mention Dowling in its Memorandum Decision. In Dowling, the Utah Supreme Court's 
reasoning that in order for the Malpractice Act to apply, "the alleged malpractice must 
"relat[e] to or aris[e] out of health care rendered "for5 to or on behalf of a patient during 
the patients' medical care, treatment, or confinement." Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-
403(10)6. Not unlike Dowling, Appellant is not the "complaining patient" and the 
Malpractice Act does not control. 
In their Briefs, Appellees were unable to successfully counter the applicability of 
Dowling to the facts in this matter, so they both quickly disregarded7 it by arguing that 
6
 Previously codified as Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3(10). 
7
 Appellees Brown/Clinic cite the case of Darlington v. Willow Wood Care Center, 2006 
UT App 370, for the proposition that all loss of consortium claims must satisfy the 
9 
Dowling did not apply because it involved the "direct tort" of alienation of affection and 
not the derivative claim of loss of affection. See Blomquist Appellee Brief at 15 and 
Appellees Brown/Clinic's Brief at 8. Both analyses fail. As argued at length above, the 
"nominally derivative" nature of Appellant's loss of consortium claim does not 
automatically subject it to the provisions of the Malpractice Act. See Hackford at 1290. 
Furthermore, because he Mrs. Nordgren has not made a "claim" for it to be derivative to, 
then Appellant's loss of consortium claim is, in fact, a "direct tort", which would make 
the reasoning in Dowling is even more instructive, with competing case law or foil force 
and effect in their Briefs, Appellees made slight mention of either discounted it claiming 
that such application would ignore the derivative nature of a loss of consortium claim. 
Appellant's loss of consortium claim should be analyzed under the holding in 
Dowling. There is no contention that Appellees provided any care to Appellant. All care 
was provided to Mrs. Nordgren, and Appellant's claims stem from that care. Therefore, 
Appellant is not a "complaining patient" and the Malpractice Act does not apply to his 
claims. 
procedural requirements of the Act. This one-page Utah Court of Appeals decision was 
unreported and did not analyze or even address how the Malpractice Act's procedural 
formalities applied to loss of consortium claims and should therefore, be disregarded. 
10 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should hold that the trial court made reversible 
errors when it dismissed Appellant's claim, and that Appellant filed a valid, timely claim 
under Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4). Further, the Court should reverse the trial court's 
decision and remand this case to the trial court so the Appellant can continue to prosecute 
his claims. 
DATED this 16th day of April, 2010. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Craig G. Adkhsoft (]~ 
Craig A. Hoggan 
Debra Griffiths Handley 
Attorneys for Appellant 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of April, 2010,1 caused to be mailed via first-
class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of APPELLANT'S REPLY 
BRIEF to the following: 
George T. Naegle 
Anne Armstrong 
RICHARDS BRANDT MDXER & NELSON 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JoAnn E. Bott 
David C. Castleberry 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR 
170 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
12 
